Consumer boycotts and consumer sovereignty by Smith, N. Craig
llHll III Ill III llll II lllllll Ill l 
1402711512 
SWP 44187 CONSUMER BOYCOTTS AND 
CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY 
DR CRAIG SMITH 
Cranfield School of Management 
Cranfield Institute of Technology 
Cranfield 
Bedford MK43 OAL 
(Tel: 0234 751122) 
Forthcoming in European Journal of Marketing 
Copyright: Smith 1987 
ABSTRACT 
This paper considers how consumer boycotts may be understood 
as consumer behaviour. The concept of consumer sovereignty 
is identified as the implicit paradigm for the marketing 
discipline. It is then applied to consumer boycotts in 
illustration of this claim and in explanation of consumer 
boycotts as consumer behaviour. Three case examples of 
consumer boycotts support the argument. Consumer 
sovereignty is shown to have two dimensions: degree and 
domain. Information is shown to be important in determining 
the domain of consumer sovereignty and pressure groups may 
play an important role in providing this. 
Consumer boycotts are far more prevalent in the United 
States than Europe - and Britain in particular (Vogel, 
1978). Yet for more than twenty-five years the Anti- 
Apartheid Movement in Britain has been actively promoting a 
boycott of South African products. Most recently, with 
events in South Africa highlighting the pressure group's 
case, this boycott has achieved some prominence and some 
notable successes. Stores such as the Co-op, for example, 
have stopped stocking South African goods(Halsal1, 1985). 
Yet this is only indicative of a long-established consumer 
antipathy towards South African goods. According to 
research conducted by the South African embassy, as many as 
one in four consumers may view South African products as 
tainted. There are many interesting issues raised by this 
and other consumer boycotts (see Smith, 1985). This paper 
focuses on how consumer boycotts may be understood as 
consumer behaviour. 
The frequently circular arguments of consumer 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction (CS/D) analyses are eschewed in 
favour of an approach that emphasises the concept of 
consumer sovereignty. This approach, as the three case 
examples show, can more readily accommodate the sort of 
issues which inspire this form of consumer behaviour. It 
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seems somewhat banal to use the term consumer 
dissatisfaction to refer to consumer refusals to purchase 
products in protest at a firm's involvement with South 
Africa or some other major political or ethical issue. 
Moreover, consumer sovereignty can be usefully construed as 
a paradigm for the marketing discipline. This paper shows 
how such's paradigm may operate in reference to consumer 
boycotts. 
A PARADIGM FOR MARKETING 
The identification of a paradigm for a discipline is 
generally considered to be an important indicator of the 
discipline's status or advancement. There does not appear 
to be consensus on a paradigm for marketing and one might be 
tempted to judge marketing's advancement accordingly. Yet 
this would be too hasty a judgement. There is an implicit 
paradigm for marketing in the concept of consumer 
sovereignty. 
Biggadike's reasonably comprehensive review of the 
contributions of marketing is both critical and pessimistic 
(Biggadike, 1981). He suggests there is no unifying 
paradigm for the entire marketing field but there is a 
paradigm for marketing management. This paradigm llsuggests 
that marketing management tries to satisfy customers... 
within the context of the environment and the firm's 
resources and objectives (the uncontrollable factors) by 
designing an appropriate marketing mix (the four P's - 
controllable factors).l' It is not the purpose of this paper 
to dwell on the role of paradigms and previous work on 
paradigms for marketing [l]. It will merely be suggested 
that by extending Biggadikels logic it may be claimed that 
consumer sovereignty may serve as the paradigm for the 
marketing discipline. In other words, to paraphrase Thomas 
Kuhn (1970, p.lO), it is the model from which springs 
particular coherent traditions of scientific research in 
marketing. 
As it is not the foremost intention here to claim such a 
role for consumer sovereignty, an alternative role is 
proposed. This is discussed in the next section. Advancing 
a paradigm for marketing demands a lengthy and intricate 
argument. It is epistemologically difficult because it 
involves a process of stepping outside the discipline to 
observe and describe the dominant paradigm within the 
discipline. Finally, it may be largely futile in much the 
same way as marketing's earlier worries about whether it may 
claim to be a science. As Baker has sensibly observed on 
this question, it is probably better to act as if marketing 
is a science [2]. Such logic can be more forcefully applied 
to the debate on marketing's paradigm. This more recent 
debate, which too may be seen as an exercise in the 
aggrandisement of the marketing discipline, is even more 
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futile. The issue is not whether marketing has a paradigm, 
for such it must have, but what that paradigm is, and 
surely this will emerge if it is not already apparent [3]. 
THE CENTRALITY OF CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY TO MARKETING 
The alternative view is that consumer sovereignty is at the 
core of marketing thought. This there is likely to be more 
agreement on. Definitions of marketing emphasise the 
consumer: "the 'marketing view' looks at the business as 
directed toward the satisfaction of a customer want and as a 
purveyor of a customer utility" (Drucker quoted in Boyd et 
al, 1972, p.3); Wmarketing is the performance of business 
activities which direct the flow of goods and services from 
producer to consumer or user in order to satisfy customers 
and accomplish the company's objectivesm (McCarthy, 1975, 
p.19); Hmarketing is the way in which an organisation 
matches its own human, financial and physical resources with 
the wants of its customers" (Christopher et al, 1980, p.3). 
The marketing discipline and a marketing orientation in 
practice, are predicated upon a belief in consumer 
sovereignty. This is implicit in all definitions of 
marketing. Kotler makes it explicit: 
"The marketing concept expresses the company's 
commitment to the time-honoured concept in 
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economic theory known as consumer sovereignty. 
The determination of what is to be produced should 
not be in the hands of the companies or in the 
hands of government but in the hands of consumers. 
The companies produce what the consumers want and 
in this way maximise consumer welfare and earn 
their profits" (1984, pp.22-23). 
In the teaching of marketing, students are asked to believe 
that the customer is of supreme importance: that the 
customer is the starting point for all marketing management 
decisions. This act of faith is supported by appeals to 
common sense (or rather, more accurately, and as later 
disussed, the ideology of the market) and reference to 
commercial failures that resulted from the absence of a 
customer orientation, such as Sinclair's C5. Further 
support may come from the latest 'pop@ management gurus. In 
In Search of Excellence, for example, Peters and Waterman 
implore 'stay close to the customerl. 
Yet the teacher of marketing might alternatively, or 
additionally, present a theoretical case to the above of 
saying 'believe the customer is important'. Very briefly, 
the following argument could be employed. Firstly, it would 
be observed that the practice of marketing is relatively 
recent, a structural response to changed economic conditions 
where supply exceeds demand [4]. The position would then be 
taken - though to some it might seem quite novel - that 
marketing has something to do with markets [5]. It could be 
observed that, as Bartels has shown, marketing has its 
origins in economics (Bartels, 1976). There would then 
follow detailed consideration of how product markets work. 
The discussion could be suitably spiced with favoured 
quotations from the classical and neo-classical economists; 
Smith's The Wealth of Nations is an obvious rich source, but 
so is Friedman's Free to Choose. The Austrian economist 
Mises also has much to offer and an example from Human 
Action neatly illustrates the flavour of the class 
discussion which would be taking place in the presentation 
of this theoretical case for a customer orientation in 
marketing: 
wThe direction of all economic affairs is in the 
market society a task of the entrepreneurs. 
Theirs is the control of production. They are at 
the helm and steer the ship. A superficial 
observer would believe that they are supreme. But 
they are not. They are bound to obey 
unconditionally the captain's orders. The captain 
is the consumer" (1949, p.270). 
After some wallowing in the euphoria of free market 
economics, the discussion might be brought down to earth by 
introducing the idea of mixed markets and producer 
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sovereignty. Blatant ideology would be displaced by some 
measure of realism through reference to critics such as 
Galbraith and to mainstream economics. Consumer 
sovereignty, having been shown to be central to 
understanding markets and an underlying and unifying concept 
to the various definitions of marketing which abound (see, 
for example, Crosier, 1975), can then be defined as a 
technical term used to refer to degrees of consumer 
authority in markets. Finally, the circumstances under 
which this authority is enhanced (principally, where this is 
choice, information and retailer assessments), and 
restricted (a lack of competition, government intervention 
and limits to personal wealth) may be covered. It will be 
concluded that in many markets, largely because of 
competition, there is a considerable degree of consumer 
sovereignty. 
So, as far as management practice is concerned, firms 
wishing to be successful in competitive markets have to 
follow the wants of the customer. They must be market 
driven. The next class could then explore the constraints 
on the firm in doing this - the marketing environment and 
the organisation's resources, what the firm is good at. The 
task of marketing management might then be understood in 
terms of the manipulation of the marketing mix so as to 
match the firm's resources with the wants of the customer 
and so on. 
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In such a way, consumer sovereignty can be shown to be 
central to marketing if not the paradigm for the discipline. 
Yet acceptance of such a paradigm or simply the recognition 
of the underpinning of the marketing discipline by the 
concept of consumer sovereignty, does highlight a feature of 
marketing which academics, as social scientists, might 
prefer to ignore. This is the acknowledgement of the 
ideological basis to marketing thought. It is a factor 
likely to militate against the recognition of consumer 
sovereignty as the paradigm for marketing. 
IDEOLOGY AND MARKETING 
Ideologies serve two purposes: they provide an explanation 
for and the justification of interests. Berger and Kellner 
briefly define ideology as Ira set of definitions of reality 
legitimating specific vested interests in societyM (Berger 
and Kellner, 1981). Berger has earlier written: 
"We speak of an ideology when a certain idea 
serves a vested interest in society. Very 
frequently, though not always, ideologies 
systematically distort social reality in order to 
come out where it is functional for them to do 
so.. . The ideology of free enterprise serves to 
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camouflage the monopolistic practices of large 
American corporations" (Berger, 1966, p.130). 
The ideology of the competitive model of capitalism, one of 
the most dominant ideologies in the West, both explains 
capitalism and justifies the interests of capitalists 
(producers). A cynic might be tempted to observe that the 
activities and power of business are made acceptable to 
society by an ideology that proclaims business is not 
powerful at all, but under the control of consumers. This 
is the latent function of marketing. To twist a quote from 
Lindblom, consumers are not really sovereign under 
capitalism; they only think they are [6]. Marketing fosters 
this belief. 
Ideology serves as an idea structure both for understanding 
and for legitimising one's interests. Founding the 
marketing concept on consumer sovereignty might be seen as 
highly convenient . At the base level it permits corporate 
power - expressed in strategies and other ways - while 
claiming the corporation has no power and is merely acting 
in accord with the wishes of the consumer. Of course, this 
is not the way the corporations would see it - or, perhaps, 
marketing academics speaking on their behalf. Corporate 
executives believe in the power of the consumer because this 
is how ideologies work. Any guilt they may have, about 
dubious practices that are a consequence of corporate power 
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or merely the recognition of that power, is allayed in the 
process. For as well as justifying interests, ideologies 
also offer explanations, which are likely to be adhered to 
by their subscribers. As Silk and Vogel write of the 
ideologies of managers: "Ideology functions not simply to 
advance a particular interest..... but to enable people to 
orient themselves to a complicated and confusing world" 
(1976, pp.31-32). It is not sufficient to think of them in 
Machiavellian, manipulative terms. Such ideologies should 
be respected as legitimate views of the world. This said 
however, what is their place within an academic discipline? 
Insofar as it is possible to disentangle the ideological 
from the 'scientific' or 'factual', how large an ideological 
component can a respectable academic discipline tolerate? 
The marketing discipline seems to have a large ideological 
component. Bartels has shown that marketing's origins lie 
in the separation of economics and marketing with the 
practitioners falling in the latter camp (Bartels, 1976). 
Is it surprising that they should build a body of knowledge 
legitimising their activities, and on the most convenient 
grounds of all, that they are merely serving the best 
interests of the consumer and are tools at his or her 
command? 
Yet marketing is not the only discipline which can be 
analysed in this way. The other management disciplines may 
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be likewise criticised, as Honour and Mainwaring argue when 
writing in criticism of the "attitudes and values of 
business studies lecturers who seem untroubled by the basis 
and uses of the knowledge and values they seek to pass on" 
(1982). Moreover, Andreski, in Social Sciences as Sorcery, 
claims that the social sciences frequently act to serve the 
interests of the wielders of power, putting a pseudo- 
scientific gloss on the crude realities of power and giving 
their blessing to the status-quo. He argues that "much of 
what passes as scientific study of human behaviour boils 
down to an equivalent of sorcery" (1972, p.10). So, for 
example, he finds ideology underneath scientific 
terminology, referring by way of illustration to Talcott 
Parsons' conception of power as explained by Lipset, which 
legitimates excesses by authority holders because they are 
"socially necessary" (pp.172-173). This is more of a latent 
than manifest function of the social sciences, but marketing 
as a discipline may well be a prime exponent of this, acting 
in the interests of producers. 
'TESTING' THE IDEOLOGY 
To sum-up the argument so far. Consumer sovereignty, if not 
the paradigm for marketing, is at the core of marketing 
thought. However, this constitutes a major ideological 
component to the discipline. Marketing's model of how 
markets work is very close to that of the free-market 
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economists who espouse an idealised understanding of markets 
directed by what may be best termed as absolute consumer 
sovereignty. Such a model is easily displaced when real 
world markets are considered; mixed markets, where 
competition may be limited, consumer information restricted 
and, accordingly, a large degree of producer sovereignty 
evident. So consumer sovereignty is more accurately 
understood as a technical term referring to degrees of 
consumer authority relative to producers. The absence of 
this more accurate understanding of consumers1 status from 
marketing indicates the ideological basis to much current 
marketing thought. 
Of course, the conclusion still stands that firms in 
competitive markets have to follow the wants of the 
customer, at least as a dictate to marketing management. 
But an academic discipline that is concerned with the study 
of markets and not just the interests of producers, should 
surely acknowledge some measure of producer sovereignty, 
even in highly competitive markets. Does it not have an 
interest in consumers other than as a group to which 
something is done (by manipulating the marketing mix)? 
It might at this point be observed that the game of the 
market is not a zero-sum game. That consumers and producers 
are not inevitably in conflict and markets provide for 
mutually beneficial exchange. This is neatly illustrated in 
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the following quote from Thomas A. Murphy, as Chairman of 
General Motors: 
11 . . . competitive markets and free consumer choice 
could be relied on to set an economic course whch 
would maximise human welfare... The individual 
citizen has great capacity to modify his 
consumption patterns through free markets. If he 
does not like one product, he can choose any of 
several other possibilities - or none at all... 
This sensitive tailoring of productive resources 
to the complex and diverse preferences of people, 
expressed through free markets, is a fundamental, 
though often under-appreciated characteristic of 
our system. Each consumer, given his free choice, 
can purchase those products which he feels most 
suit his own special needs and resources. Unlike 
the political system, every person can win in an 
economic 1election'1' (in Silk and Vogel, 1976, 
p.91). 
However, this coincidence of interests is not always 
perfect. Consumers can have different interests to 
producers and particularly on issues of social 
responsibility in business. This, of course, is where 
consumer boycotts are of great interest. In consumer 
boycotts, consumers are, to use Murphy's analogy, employing 
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their purchase votes to express a difference of interest to 
producers. They are voting against business practices of 
which they disapprove by not buying a firm's product. In 
other words, they are exercising consumer sovereignty to 
express concern about and perhaps change undesirable 
activities by producers. The prospective U.S. presidential 
candidate Jesse Jackson has used consumer sovereignty in 
this way in his campaigns for civil rights. He has 
observed: 
'IWe have the power, nonviolently, just by 
controlling our appetites, to determine the 
direction of the American economy. If black 
people in thirty cities said simultaneously, 
'General Motors, you will not sell cars in the 
black community unless you guarantee us a 
franchise here next year and help us finance it', 
GM would have no choice but to comply" (quoted in 
Vogel, 1978, p.39). 
Three case examples follow which illustrate this. The 
earlier discussion of consumer sovereignty provides the 
context in which they may be considered, as the conclusion 
to this paper emphasises. Moreover, the cases to some 
extent 'test' the ideology. Or, rather, they point out that 
in some circumstances 'reality' may closely conform to the 
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ideology, that consumer sovereignty may be quite extensive. 
These circumstances are later identified. 
The cases are presented here in a summary form, but they are 
available in more detail elsewhere (Smith, 1985). They 
describe the boycott of Barclays over its involvement with 
South Africa, the international boycott of Nestle over its 
marketing of baby milk to the the Third World, and the 
Californian grape boycott over union recognition. 
Barclays and South Africa 
Apartheid in South Africa is an emotive issue. It is 
purportedly a system whereby the many races of South Africa 
may coexist securely and separately, different but equal. 
Yet many would argue that it is in effect a racist ideology 
advancing separate development to maintain the economic 
exploitation of the black majority. There are probably more 
consumer boycotts in Britain over South Africa and its 
system of apartheid than any other issue. Business has been 
attacked on other fronts as well, particularly by ethical 
investment, and is frequently criticised in the press for 
having links with South Africa. 
Involvement in South Africa is a major issue of social 
responsibility in business. This is because of the economic 
function of apartheid and the role of business in 
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maintaining and benefiting from it. It is argued that 
economic progress will necessitate the incorporation of the 
blacks and end apartheid, but this is rejected by critics 
who see little evidence of this happening. Their solution 
is the armed seizure of control by the African National 
Congress (ANC) with external pressure applied in the form of 
various sanctions. While condemning apartheid, Western 
governments and business have largely resisted the pressure 
for disinvolvement in the South African economy, advocating 
constructive engagement to protect their interests. 
South Africa is dependent on Western capital in the form of 
investment and trade. Direct investment has declined 
because of criticism but has been replaced by indirect 
investment. Yet trade and investment involves an 
interdependence. So the West - and Britain and the United 
States especially - is thereby committed to the stability of 
South Africa and the maintenance of apartheid, particularly 
as the trade with South Africa involves strategic raw 
materials for which South Africa is the major source of 
SUPPlY. This is aside from the country's political and 
military significance as a bastion against communism. This 
economic, political and strategic interdependence makes the 
use of effective international economic sanctions by the 
West unlikely. Business, in turn, wishes to defend its 
economic interests and so follows the government line. 
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The use, or otherwise, of international economic sanctions 
against South Africa is closely tied to the case for and 
against business involvement in South Africa and consumer 
boycotts over this. South Africa's reliance on Western 
trade and investment has led to many calls for economic 
santions. Yet apart from the more recent token gestures 
made in response to the continued unrest in South Africa, 
there has only been the UN arms embargo and the OPEC oil 
boycott. Four principal arguments are advanced against 
sanctions: the costs for those imposing them, as referred 
to above; that they would harm the blacks most, but then it 
is said they are already suffering: doubts as to their 
effectiveness, historically there is some support for this, 
particularly when countervailing measures are employed (but 
then why oppose them?); and, finally, constructive 
engagement. The latter argument, for 'bridge-building' and 
change from within, is the most prominent. In accordance 
with this, corporate involvement is prescribed by codes of . 
conduct such as the EEC and Sullivan codes. These are 
voluntary but many firms comply to deflect criticism at 
home, and although they may have raised black living 
standards, they have not really challenged apartheid. 
Critics see little evidence of constructive engagement 
working, and particularly with the recent unrest, it has 
come to be seen as tacit support for apartheid. With 
substantial international economic sanctions not 
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forthcoming, many consumers have chosen to support a 
consumer boycott campaign. The consumer boycott is, as a 
moral act, an expression by the individual of his or her 
preferences on the issue, a sanction by the individual as 
the state is not prepared to act. It also adds to the 
aggregate of pressure for change. The revitalised boycott 
campaign has had some recent successes, especially with some 
retail outlets and the local authorities. The most well- 
known consumer boycott, of course, is of Barclays Bank. 
The trend towards indirect forms of investment in South 
Africa has singled out the banks for attack. All the major 
British banks lend to South Africa, but Barclays has a 
subsidiary there and is particularly vulnerable because of 
its high visibility, with branches on most British high 
streets. Barclays defend their involvement with the 
constructive engagement argument. Although they have a 
disproportionately small number of black employees, there is 
evidence of some improvement. This their critics accept but 
dismiss, for apartheid continues and all constructive 
engagement seems to achieve, whether by firms or 
governments, is cosmetic changes. So the pressure group End 
Loans to South Africa (ELTSA) puts what they call "moral, 
public opinion type pressure and economic pressure" on the 
bank to withdraw from South Africa and cease loans. They do 
this by promoting the boycott. Many account closures are 
claimed, the local authority and church groups who close 
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their accounts bring much valuable publicity, and this is 
despite limited resources. But ELTSA accept their economic 
impact is minimal and far from closing the gap between the 
costs and benefits of investment in South Africa. 
Yet the pressure group have succeeded in getting the bank 'Ia 
fairly dirty name," they say, and contributed to the 
pressure on the bank to withdraw from South Africa. 
Barclays respond to their criticism with public relations 
activities to present their case. They suggest "economic 
ties and investment are the only viable instruments of 
peaceful change." They note that a bank cannot simply close 
down. While little business is said to have been lost, the 
criticism hurts. It is perhaps this, rather than economic 
loss, which is best seen as having played a part in what 
appears to be the first step in a phased withdrawal from 
South Africa. No doubt deteriorating economic conditions 
were paramount, but if this interpretation of Barclays 
recent (1985) end to its majority shareholding is correct, 
then ELTSA may prove to have been successful even if its own 
efforts weren't in themselves sufficient. Of course, 
constructive engagement may become a plausible argument 
again, in which case the withdrawal may be halted or even 
reversed. 
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Nestle and the Marketina of Babv Milk to the Third World 
'Commerciogenic malnutrition' was not the consequence of the 
marketing of a bad product, but its marketing in 
inappropriate circumstances. It took Nestle, with around 
half of the baby milk market worldwide and one of the 
largest food companies in the world, more than fifteen years 
to realise and accept this and take appropriate action to 
curtail their marketing excesses. For the latter ten years 
their deficiencies were forcibly brought to their attention 
by pressure groups. This ended most of the marketing 
practices of concern and involved the pressure groups in an 
audit commission monitoring the firm's marketing of infant 
formula in the Third World. 
Prior to the launch of the boycott, Nestle largely ignored 
the issue of infant mortality resulting from baby milk 
misuse. One Swiss pressure group published a pamphlet 
outlining the case against Nestle, for which the firm took 
them to court and succeeded in getting a libel judgement, 
but at the cost of considerable adverse publicity including 
criticism of the firm's practices by the judge. Other 
critics they similarly condemned. A token attempt at self- 
regulation was made via the International Council of Infant 
Food Industries (ICIFI), the industry's representative body. 
But this was so inadequate that the Protein-Calorie Advisory 
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Group, a UN agency, refused to endorse it and one firm left 
to act independently and more effectively on the issue. The 
industry's critics were far from satisfied, so in 1977 the 
consumer boycott was launched in the United States. 
Nestle was the target because it was the market leader but 
also because of its intransigence. The Infant Formula 
Action Coalition (INFACT), the principal pressure group 
acting against Nestle, achieved widespread public 
recognition of this when they persuaded Senator Kennedy to 
hold a hearing on the issue. Nestle ignored the problems 
in the marketing of baby milk, indisputably established by 
many experts at the hearing, and tried to attack the 
pressure groups as a threat to free enterprise. Finally 
recognising public opinion was going against it, the firm 
chose to respond less antagonistically. However, it did not 
address the issue but attempted to more effectively defend 
its position using public relations activities. 
When the World Health Organisation (WHO) became involved, 
Nestle found, particularly as the concerned pressure groups 
were directly participating, that they could not avoid 
restrictions on their marketing practices. Their more 
surreptitious attempts to influence this by trying to co-opt 
WHO officials came to light, as did their role in organising 
a pro-Nestle article in Fortune, and were to no avail. The 
group monitoring Nestle's (and others') activities in the 
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Third World, the International Baby Food Action Network 
(IBF=J) t continued to identify abuses. Yet when, in 1981, 
the firm gave its support to the WHO code, it could not 
convince its critics of its intentions to seriously deal 
with the issue. The pressure groups wanted to be sure the 
code was enforced and used the boycott to this end. Efforts 
were even made to increase the international scope of the 
boycott. 
In 1982, Nestle announced that its policy was then in 
accordance with WHO guidelines and that its practices were 
to be monitored by the Nestle Infant Formula Audit 
Commission (NIFAC), an independent body. Many of the firm's 
critics dismissed this as no more than a public relations 
exercise, but for others, and increasingly so, it came to be 
recognised as a genuine effort to tackle the issue. When, 
in January 1984, the firm agreed to meet four outstanding 
grievances [7] identified by the pressure groups and defined 
to both parties' satisfaction by the intermediary UNICEF, 
the boycott was suspended. It was officially ended in 
October 1984. 
The Nestle boycott was plainly successful. Its economic 
impact was claimed to be substantial, though this is 
difficult to establish. More important was the impact on 
corporate image and employee morale, and the costs of giving 
management attention to the boycott. Its success was 
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acknowledged as showing how corporations may be called to 
account via the marketplace and it serves as an example for 
similar campaigns. 
The California Grape Boycott 
The 1965-70 California grape boycott was both highly 
effective and successful. It achieved unionisation for 
Californian farm workers when all previous efforts and 
methods had failed. But the case is not simply about the 
right of labour to organise. It also involved minority 
rights, poverty, pesticide misuse, and civil rights. 
Strikes had proved ineffective in the organisation of farm 
workers because of their mobility and the use of 
strikebreakers. Just as the early American labour unions 
had found, strikebreaking meant recourse to the consumer 
boycott. Certain factors in the late 1960's proved to be 
important in its effectiveness, most notably: popular 
support for l,la causal (the cause): the structure of the 
grape market, especially its concentration of sales through 
the supermarkets, with about 50% of sales in ten major 
cities; and the relative stability of the table grape farm 
workers. So great was the support for the union and the 
concentration of grape sales, that an effective boycott of 
all table grapes was achieved. The growers were coerced 
into capitulation. 
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UFWOC (the United Farm Workers Organising Committee), 
although a fledgling union, was more like a promotional 
pressure group than a sectional one. This was particularly 
evident in its having to deal with two constituencies: the 
mainly Chicano farm workers in rural California, and middle 
class urban America. Cesar Chavez was the inspirational 
leader that managed, through adherence to Alinskyls 
principles and non-violent direct action, to unite these 
diverse supporters in a common struggle. Particularly 
important were the public confrontations with the growers 
and their supporters, which served to highlight the growers' 
moral failings to those outside rural California. Given the 
need to build and mobilise popular support for the boycott, 
the role of the union organisers was crucial. The way they 
operated, as representatives of UFWOC, reflected the union's 
structure and methods, which not only avoided the alienation 
of potential supporters but even enhanced support. 
The growers, by contrast, managed to lose support with 
almost every action they took. Their violence (such as 
well-documented attacks on picket lines) and attempts to set 
up company unions are appropriate examples of this. When 
they finally involved a public relations firm a little more 
sophistication was employed. The case was effectively made 
for allowing the consumer choice, but it was too late. 
Despite the previous bias of the judiciary, the growers 
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failed to get a ruling prohibiting the boycott. And 
although they had government supporters, legislation could 
not be realised to achieve this aim because of divisions 
among the growers. 
The boycott was organised on a large scale, with boycott 
committees effective in the major North American markets and 
operating in most North American cities. They comprised a 
broad coalition of supporters, from religious organisations 
to consumer groups, each could identify in some way with 'la 
causal. Picketing and a variety of events, such as the 
Boston Grape Party, ensured the effectiveness of the primary 
and secondary boycotts; though this was not achieved 
overnight. The union had to learn to target the outlets 
selectively and recognise that different cities demanded 
different approaches. 
The growers capitulated because of the demonstrable 
effectiveness of the boycott. Some even admitted this. In 
some markets, grape shipments, and hence sales, were down by 
more than a third. While the union failed to anticipate the 
vulnerability of their contracts with the growers and had 
again to resort to the boycott to consolidate their gains, 
the 1965-70 boycott was an outstanding success. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In each of the three cases, consumers have sought to assert 
their sovereignty in the marketplace. They have expressed 
concern about and attempted to remedy, perceived 
shortcomings in corporate social responsibility. This 
suggests, in these specific circumstances at least, an 
extension of consumer sovereignty beyond its mere technical 
meaning within economics to a more literally accurate 
meaning: closer, indeed, to the more ideological position 
earlier criticised. The circumstances permitting this 
extension need, however, to be noted - in particular, the 
role of pressure groups in providing the necessary 
information on the social responsibility issue. 
A novel perspective on consumer sovereignty is suggested by 
consumer boycotts. Consumer authority in the marketplace 
may not simply refer to the more immediate characteristics 
of the offering such as product features or price but, as 
boycotts show, other characteristics such as whether the 
firm has investments in South Africa. Here, a distinction 
can usefully be made between the degree and the domain of 
consumer sovereignty. 
Formerly, writers on consumer sovereignty have concentrated 
on the degree of consumer authority (see, for example, 
Galbraithls work, such as American Capitalism (1963)). In 
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their assessments, reference is usually made to how much 
competition there is. In looking at consumer boycotts, the 
concern, in contrast, is not so much with the amount of 
authority the buyer has vis-a-vis the seller, though that is 
important, but with the domain of that authority. Put 
otherwise, it is not the decree of consumer sovereignty, how 
much influence the buyer has, but the jurisdiction of 
consumer sovereignty, the issues over which the buyer may 
have influence. 
Consider a simple example. Consumers may choose to buy 
Spanish oranges in preference to South African oranges 
because they taste better or are cheaper. They may, 
alternatively, choose to buy Spanish oranges in preference 
because they do not wish to support apartheid. In either 
case there must be consumer choice, there must be 
competition to provide some degree of consumer sovereignty. 
The domain of consumer sovereignty, however, refers to 
whether consumers can only express concern about such 
features as the price, colour or taste of the product, or 
whether they can express concern about much wider issues. 
Country of origin, dubious activities of the firm in some 
remote sphere of its operations, and many other ethical 
considerations can or could feature in purchase behaviour. 
Whether they do or whether they could, in specific 
instances, depends on the domain of consumer sovereignty. 
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As an oversimplification, consumers have to be concerned, 
willing and able for a boycott to be effective. They have 
to know and be concerned about the issue in question. They 
have to be willing to use their purchasing on the issue. 
And they must be able in the sense of being capable of 
transferring to another firm's product - there must be 
consumer choice. (The only alternative where there is an 
absence of consumer choice is refraining from purchase of 
the item altogether, as in the California grape boycott 
case.) It is these requirements which point to a role for 
pressure groups in the marketing system to enhance consumer 
sovereignty. While they can do little to ensure 
competition, they can provide the necessary information and 
encouragement required for consumer boycotts. 
So, consumer boycotts may be usefully understood as 
consumers exercising consumer sovereignty. This suggests 
that consumer sovereignty may be seen as having two 
dimensions: degree and domain. Degree refers to the amount 
of consumer authority relative to producers. Domain refers 
to the jurisdiction of that authority. The domain of 
consumer sovereignty is seen in the consumer boycott cases 
to have been enhanced by the provision of information by 
concerned pressure groups. By illustration, the article has 
also shown how the more central concerns of marketing - as 
the study of markets - may be addressed. It may even in 
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such a way confirm consumer sovereignty as the paradigm for 
the discipline. 
Notes 
1. See, for example, Arndt (1985) or Foxall (1984). 
2. Baker writes "The case for accepting marketing as a 
science is clearly a good one. It diverts energy spent 
on arguing over the criteria of what is science to more 
fruitful application elsewhere and ensures a more 
integrated approach towards marketing from both the 
academics and the practitionersI (1983, p.32). This 
author does not find the case as strong as Baker 
suggests, principally because of the partisan substance 
of most marketing writing, teaching and research (as 
later indicated), and the likely continuation of this 
orientation. As Hunt (1976) notes "If...the entire 
conceptual domain of marketing is 
profit/micro/normative, then marketing is not and (more 
importantly) probably cannot be a science.l' He goes on 
to suggest marketing could be a science if the 
conceptual domain includes both micro/positive and 
macro/positive phenomena (macromarketing). Yet there is 
little real evidence of this orientation and the 
situation does not seem likely to change. However, this 
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article might be seen as a contribution within Hunt's 
broadened conceptual domain! 
3. Consumer sovereignty as the paradigm 
here advanced only by illustration. 
for marketing is 
If this is 
insufficient then either such a claim is incorrect or it 
is not yet the time for the emergence of marketing's 
paradigm. 
4. As Foxall (1984) puts it "Marketing-orientation is 
itself no more than an appropriate response to a given 
market structure: high levels of intra-industrial 
competition, the capacity for supply to exceed demand 
and consumer affluence as manifested in a large measure 
of discretionary spending. The adoption and 
implementation of the marketing concept are by no means 
the altruistic acts implied by some marketing textbooks: 
they derive from the recognition that, under appropriate 
conditions, a particular form of attention to customer 
requirements is essential if the goals of the producer 
are to be achieved." 
5. Marketing is rarely considered to be about the study of 
markets. So Barnhill and Lawson (1980) comment While 
considerable effort has been devoted to developing the 
theory of markets, those developments have been 
predominantly in the field of economics. There has been 
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little development of the theory of markets in the field 
of marketing, yet markets are a central and necessary 
state of being as well as a precondition for the 
function of common marketing components such as buyer 
behaviour, pricing... None of these marketing components 
are viable without a market in which to function.It 
6. In a closely analogous way, Lindblom notes that liberty 
may have the form of freedom from indoctrination, for 
under liberal democracy men are not really free, they 
only think they are: ItA communist intellectual asks: 
'What are people free from in the Soviet Union? They 
are free from exploitation, from all moral oppression, 
and consequently their thinking and deeds are free from 
the age-old shackles created by the economic, political 
and moral rule of the exploiters'. It is not a 
ridiculous argument... in polyarchy not only are people 
indoctrinated - as inevitably in all societies - but 
they are heavily indoctrinated by leadership and a 
favoured classI' (1977, p.265). 
7. The limiting of free supplies of powdered baby milk, the 
stopping of all personal gifts to health workers by the 
baby milk producers, the revision of misleading 
literature for mothers and health workers, and the 
inclusion of clear warnings on baby milk labels about 
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the hazards of bottle feeding and the benefits of breast 
feeding. 
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